A Cognitive Root in Fairness
[DRAFT COMING SOON]
[abstract]
We explore whether complexity shape which fairness views people follow. We report findings from a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted with school students aged 10 to 15, a sample with significant cognitive variation and a uniform background. In the experiment, participants decide how to distribute earnings between workers who completed tasks under unequal opportunities. First, we examine whether differences in cognitive ability predict which fairness rules people follow. We find that more able participants are more likely to follow meritocratic fairness views and prefer to compensate workers based on effort. The difference is driven by those who account for the unequal opportunities workers experience (a more complex decision rule), coinciding with a decline in egalitarian responses (a simpler decision rule). Second, we analyze the procedural aspects of the decisions. We show that more able individuals are better equipped to handle the counterfactual inferences needed to account for unequal opportunities. A between-subject manipulation shows that providing this step closes the decision gap within meritocrats, whose decision rules differ only in the use of that step, with the treatment effect concentrated in low able individuals. These findings highlight the role of procedural choice in distribution decision-making and underscore cognition as an additional determinant of fairness pluralism.